User:IssaRice/Computability and logic/Eliezer Yudkowsky's Löb's theorem puzzle: Difference between revisions
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| So far, everything is fine. But can we assert <math>\mathsf{PA}' \vdash \Box(\Box L \to C)</math>? For <math>\mathsf{PA}</math>, we had the following: | So far, everything is fine. But can we assert <math>\mathsf{PA}' \vdash \Box(\Box L \to C)</math>? For <math>\mathsf{PA}</math>, we had the following: | ||
| :A1: For each <math>X</math>, if <math>\mathsf{PA}\vdash X</math> then <math>\mathsf{PA} \vdash \Box X</math> | :A1: For each sentence <math>X</math>, if <math>\mathsf{PA}\vdash X</math> then <math>\mathsf{PA} \vdash \Box X</math> | ||
| We need the following: | We need the following: | ||
| :A1′: For each <math>X</math>, if <math>\mathsf{PA}'\vdash X</math> then <math>\mathsf{PA}' \vdash \Box X</math> | :A1′: For each sentence <math>X</math>, if <math>\mathsf{PA}'\vdash X</math> then <math>\mathsf{PA}' \vdash \Box X</math> | ||
| Since <math>\mathsf{PA}'</math> has more axioms than <math>\mathsf{PA}</math>, we know that <math>\mathsf{PA}'</math> can prove everything that <math>\mathsf{PA}</math> can. Thus, compared to A1, both the antecedent and consequent of A1′ are stronger, so A1′ does not necessarily follow from A1. | Since <math>\mathsf{PA}'</math> has more axioms than <math>\mathsf{PA}</math>, we know that <math>\mathsf{PA}'</math> can prove everything that <math>\mathsf{PA}</math> can. Thus, compared to A1, both the antecedent and consequent of A1′ are stronger, so A1′ does not necessarily follow from A1. | ||
Revision as of 04:28, 10 February 2019
original link: https://web.archive.org/web/20160319050228/http://lesswrong.com/lw/t6/the_cartoon_guide_to_l%C3%B6bs_theorem/
current LW link: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/ALCnqX6Xx8bpFMZq3/the-cartoon-guide-to-loeb-s-theorem
Notation
Precedence:
- has high precedence, so e.g. means , and means .
- is a metalogical notion and has low precedence, so means .
Translating the puzzle using logic notation
Löb's theorem shows that if , then .
The deduction theorem says that if , then .
Applying the deduction theorem to Löb's theorem gives us .
When translating to logic notation, it becomes obvious that the application of the deduction theorem is illegitimate, because we don't actually have . This is the initial answer that Larry D'Anna gives in comments.
But now, suppose we define , and walk through the proof of Löb's theorem for this new theory . Then we would obtain the following implication: if , then . But clearly, since is one of the axioms of . Therefore by modus ponens, we have , i.e. . Now we can apply the deduction theorem to obtain . This means that our "Löb's theorem" for must be incorrect (note: the proof is correct for , which is why Löb's theorem is a theorem; it's just incorrect for ), and somewhere in the ten-step proof is an error.
Translating the Löb's theorem back to logic
http://yudkowsky.net/assets/44/LobsTheorem.pdf
Since the solution to the puzzle refers back to the proof of Löb's theorem, we first translate the proof from the cartoon version back to logic:
Repeating the proof of Löb's theorem for modified theory
We now repeat the proof of Löb's theorem for to see where the error is.
- by definition of
- because is one of the axioms of
So far, everything is fine. But can we assert ? For , we had the following:
- A1: For each sentence , if then
We need the following:
- A1′: For each sentence , if then
Since has more axioms than , we know that can prove everything that can. Thus, compared to A1, both the antecedent and consequent of A1′ are stronger, so A1′ does not necessarily follow from A1.
Suppose we take in A1′ to be . Then we obtain
- If then
Other ways we might try to get step 8 to work:
- if , then
Other questions to answer
- does in still mean provability about , or about itself?
- are we removing a layer or adding one?
- can't prove everything can? yes, but this doesn't mean we can substitute implications automatically because the consequent also gets stronger