User:IssaRice/Computability and logic/Semantic completeness: Difference between revisions

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# Let <math>\Gamma</math> be a set of sentences, and let <math>\phi</math> be a sentence. If <math>\Gamma \models \phi</math>, then <math>\Gamma \vdash \phi</math>.
# Let <math>\Gamma</math> be a set of sentences, and let <math>\phi</math> be a sentence. If <math>\Gamma \models \phi</math>, then <math>\Gamma \vdash \phi</math>.
# Let <math>\Gamma</math> be a set of sentences. If <math>\Gamma</math> is consistent, then <math>\Gamma</math> is satisfiable (has a model).
# Let <math>\Gamma</math> be a set of sentences. If <math>\Gamma</math> is consistent, then <math>\Gamma</math> is satisfiable (has a model).
===Proof idea===
===Proof===


==References==
==References==


<references/>
<references/>

Revision as of 18:59, 7 April 2019

Semantic completeness is sometimes written as: if Σϕ, then Σϕ.

Semantic completeness is the completeness that is the topic of Godel's completeness theorem.

Semantic completeness differs from negation completeness.

Semantic completeness is about the completeness of a logic (not about the completeness of a theory).

Definition

I want to make sure all these definitions are saying the same thing, so let me list some from several textbooks so I can explicitly compare.

Smith's definition: a logic is semantically complete iff for any set of wffs Σ and any sentence ϕ, if Σϕ then Σϕ.[1]

Leary/Kristiansen's definition: A deductive system consisting of logical axioms Λ and a collection of rules of inference is said to be complete iff for every set of nonlogical axioms Σ and every L-formula ϕ, if Σϕ, then Σϕ.[2]

Alternative formulation

It is possible to formulate completeness by saying that a consistent set of sentences is satisfiable. In other words, the following are equivalent:

  1. Let Γ be a set of sentences, and let ϕ be a sentence. If Γϕ, then Γϕ.
  2. Let Γ be a set of sentences. If Γ is consistent, then Γ is satisfiable (has a model).

Proof idea

Proof

References

  1. Peter Smith. An Introduction to Godel's Theorems. p. 33.
  2. Leary; Kristiansen. A Friendly Introduction to Mathematical Logic. p. 74.