User:IssaRice/Computability and logic/Semantic completeness: Difference between revisions

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The trick in the proof is to notice that the <math>\Gamma</math> that appears in (1) is not the same as the <math>\Gamma</math> that appears in (2). Since <math>\Gamma</math> is an arbitrary set of sentences in each of (1) and (2), we can use a different set of sentences than the arbitrary <math>\Gamma</math> we are given. In other words, the statement of the proposition obfuscates the situation a bit by using the same symbol for "different things" in the proof. One might ask why one would obfuscate things this way, and it seems like a good response is that if you're just stating one of the formulations in isolation, you would just use your "default variable" for a set of sentences. For instance, if you use <math>\Gamma</math> for a set of sentences, then if someone asked you to state (1), you would use <math>\Gamma</math>. Then if someone asked you to state (2) a few weeks later, you wouldn't use <math>\Delta</math> or <math>\Sigma</math> unless you had (1) in mind.
The trick in the proof is to notice that the <math>\Gamma</math> that appears in (1) is not the same as the <math>\Gamma</math> that appears in (2). Since <math>\Gamma</math> is an arbitrary set of sentences in each of (1) and (2), we can use a different set of sentences than the arbitrary <math>\Gamma</math> we are given. In other words, the statement of the proposition obfuscates the situation a bit by using the same symbol for "different things" in the proof. One might ask why one would obfuscate things this way, and it seems like a good response is that if you're just stating one of the formulations in isolation, you would just use your "default variable" for a set of sentences. For instance, if you use <math>\Gamma</math> for a set of sentences, then if someone asked you to state (1), you would use <math>\Gamma</math>. Then if someone asked you to state (2) a few weeks later, you wouldn't use <math>\Delta</math> or <math>\Sigma</math> unless you had (1) in mind.
The other trick is to figure out just what to use as <math>\Gamma</math> when going from (1) to (2), and to figure out what to do with <math>\phi</math> when going from (2) to (1).


===Proof===
===Proof===

Revision as of 19:07, 7 April 2019

Semantic completeness is sometimes written as: if Σϕ, then Σϕ.

Semantic completeness is the completeness that is the topic of Godel's completeness theorem.

Semantic completeness differs from negation completeness.

Semantic completeness is about the completeness of a logic (not about the completeness of a theory).

Definition

I want to make sure all these definitions are saying the same thing, so let me list some from several textbooks so I can explicitly compare.

Smith's definition: a logic is semantically complete iff for any set of wffs Σ and any sentence ϕ, if Σϕ then Σϕ.[1]

Leary/Kristiansen's definition: A deductive system consisting of logical axioms Λ and a collection of rules of inference is said to be complete iff for every set of nonlogical axioms Σ and every L-formula ϕ, if Σϕ, then Σϕ.[2]

Alternative formulation

It is possible to formulate completeness by saying that a consistent set of sentences is satisfiable. In other words, the following are equivalent:

  1. Let Γ be a set of sentences, and let ϕ be a sentence. If Γϕ, then Γϕ.
  2. Let Γ be a set of sentences. If Γ is consistent, then Γ is satisfiable (has a model).

Proof idea

The trick in the proof is to notice that the Γ that appears in (1) is not the same as the Γ that appears in (2). Since Γ is an arbitrary set of sentences in each of (1) and (2), we can use a different set of sentences than the arbitrary Γ we are given. In other words, the statement of the proposition obfuscates the situation a bit by using the same symbol for "different things" in the proof. One might ask why one would obfuscate things this way, and it seems like a good response is that if you're just stating one of the formulations in isolation, you would just use your "default variable" for a set of sentences. For instance, if you use Γ for a set of sentences, then if someone asked you to state (1), you would use Γ. Then if someone asked you to state (2) a few weeks later, you wouldn't use Δ or Σ unless you had (1) in mind.

The other trick is to figure out just what to use as Γ when going from (1) to (2), and to figure out what to do with ϕ when going from (2) to (1).

Proof

References

  1. Peter Smith. An Introduction to Godel's Theorems. p. 33.
  2. Leary; Kristiansen. A Friendly Introduction to Mathematical Logic. p. 74.