User:IssaRice/Belief propagation and cognitive biases: Difference between revisions
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* https://www.greaterwrong.com/posts/KbCHcb8yyjAMFAAPJ/when-wishful-thinking-works | * https://www.greaterwrong.com/posts/KbCHcb8yyjAMFAAPJ/when-wishful-thinking-works | ||
* https://www.gwern.net/Sunk-cost | * https://www.gwern.net/Sunk-cost | ||
* http://agentyduck.blogspot.com/2014/02/lobs-theorem-cured-my-social-anxiety.html (lol) | |||
Revision as of 05:27, 3 September 2018
- "Several cognitive biases can be seen as confusion between probabilities and likelihoods, most centrally base-rate neglect." [1]
- I think a polytree graph like can illuminate the halo effect/horn effect
- Maybe https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berkson%27s_paradox The page even says "The effect is related to the explaining away phenomenon in Bayesian networks."
- Fundamental attribution error? The simplified DAG would look like: situational influence → observed action ← personality. And the evidence feeds into the "observed action" node, which propagates upwards to the "situational influence" and "personality" nodes. I think the bias is that the "personality" node gets updated too much. Can belief propagation give insight into this?