User:IssaRice/Belief propagation and cognitive biases: Difference between revisions
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* Maybe https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berkson%27s_paradox The page even says "The effect is related to the explaining away phenomenon in Bayesian networks." | * Maybe https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berkson%27s_paradox The page even says "The effect is related to the explaining away phenomenon in Bayesian networks." | ||
* Fundamental attribution error? The simplified DAG would look like: situational influence → observed action ← personality. And the evidence feeds into the "observed action" node, which propagates upwards to the "situational influence" and "personality" nodes. I think the bias is that the "personality" node gets updated too much. Can belief propagation give insight into this? | * Fundamental attribution error? The simplified DAG would look like: situational influence → observed action ← personality. And the evidence feeds into the "observed action" node, which propagates upwards to the "situational influence" and "personality" nodes. I think the bias is that the "personality" node gets updated too much. Can belief propagation give insight into this? | ||
* This one might be too simple, but the idea of [https://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/Screening_off screening off] I think can be visualized in a Bayesian network. Not sure where the belief propagation would come in though... | |||
==possibly related== | ==possibly related== | ||
Revision as of 05:33, 3 September 2018
- "Several cognitive biases can be seen as confusion between probabilities and likelihoods, most centrally base-rate neglect." [1]
- I think a polytree graph like can illuminate the halo effect/horn effect
- Maybe https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berkson%27s_paradox The page even says "The effect is related to the explaining away phenomenon in Bayesian networks."
- Fundamental attribution error? The simplified DAG would look like: situational influence → observed action ← personality. And the evidence feeds into the "observed action" node, which propagates upwards to the "situational influence" and "personality" nodes. I think the bias is that the "personality" node gets updated too much. Can belief propagation give insight into this?
- This one might be too simple, but the idea of screening off I think can be visualized in a Bayesian network. Not sure where the belief propagation would come in though...
