Equivalence of random coinflips view and minimal programs view
Two of the several ways of viewing the deterministic variant of Solomonoff induction are:
- The "random coinflips view": Given a monotone Turing machine, we feed the machine with random data (such as from unbiased coinflips). The probability of string is then the probability that the machine outputs something starting with . This one is somewhat hard to think about, because one usually thinks of a Turing machine as e.g. a Python interpreter that takes Python programs. If one feeds a Python interpreter with randomness, one is likely to end up running a horrible mess that isn't even syntactically valid. I guess the reply here is something like (1) if a program isn't even syntactically valid, it just results in a program with no output; (2) using an encoding, one can filter out all invalid programs so that each input into the UTM does something; (3) more generally, thinking of "coinflips" is meant to suggest the idea that one has no information about what the program looks like.
- The "minimal programs view": Given a monotone Turing machine , the minimal programs producing are those programs such that (i.e. when run with produces an output starting with ) and such that no proper prefix of produces (i.e. if then ). This view then says that to get the probability of , we add up all the minimal programs weighted by length as follows: for each program we assign the weight , where is the length of in bits. Thus the measure is , where the sum is taken over all minimal programs producing . The idea with the is that there are programs of length , so given just the information that has length , the probability that we have a specific program is .
These two views turn out to be equivalent in the sense that .